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“Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside —
The Case of Terri Schiavo
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
For the first time in the history of the United States,
Congress met in a special emergency session on
Sunday, March 20, to pass legislation aimed at the
medical care of one patient — Terri Schiavo. President George W. Bush encouraged the legislation
and flew back to Washington, D.C., from his vacation in Crawford, Texas, so that he could be on
hand to sign it immediately. In a statement issued
three days earlier, he said: “The case of Terri Schiavo raises complex issues. . . . Those who live at
the mercy of others deserve our special care and
concern. It should be our goal as a nation to build a
culture of life, where all Americans are valued, welcomed, and protected — and that culture of life
must extend to individuals with disabilities.”1
The “culture of life” is a not-terribly-subtle reference to the antiabortion movement in the United
States, which received significant encouragement
in last year’s presidential election. The movement
may now view itself as strong enough to generate
new laws to prevent human embryos from being
created for research and to require that incompetent patients be kept alive with artificially delivered
fluids and nutrition.
How did the U.S. Congress conclude that it was
appropriate to attempt to reopen a case that had
finally been concluded after more than seven years
of litigation involving almost 20 judges? Has the
country’s culture changed so dramatically as to require a fundamental change in the law? Or do patients who cannot continue to live without artificially delivered fluids and nutrition pose previously
unrecognized or novel questions of law and ethics?
The case of Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman who
was in a persistent vegetative state and who died
on March 31, was being played out as a public
spectacle and a tragedy for her and her husband,
Michael Schiavo. Mr. Schiavo’s private feud with his
wife’s parents over the continued use of a feeding
tube was taken to the media, the courts, the Florida
legislature, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, the U.S.
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Congress, and President Bush. Since Ms. Schiavo
was in a medical and legal situation almost identical to those of two of the most well-known patients
in medical jurisprudence, Karen Ann Quinlan and
Nancy Cruzan, there must be something about
cases like theirs that defies simple solutions,
whether medical or legal. In this sense, the case of
Terri Schiavo provides an opportunity to examine
issues that most lawyers, bioethicists, and physicians believed were well settled — if not since the
1976 New Jersey Supreme Court decision in the
case of Karen Quinlan, then at least since the 1990
U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Nancy
Cruzan. Before reviewing Terri Schiavo’s case, it is
well worth reviewing the legal background information that was ignored by Congress and the president.

the ca se of karen quinlan
In 1976, the case of Karen Quinlan made international headlines when her parents sought the assistance of a judge to discontinue the use of a ventilator in their daughter, who was in a persistent
vegetative state.2 Ms. Quinlan’s physicians had refused her parents’ request to remove the ventilator
because, they said, they feared that they might be
held civilly or even criminally liable for her death.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that competent persons have a right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment and that this right should not be lost
when a person becomes incompetent. Since the
court believed that the physicians were unwilling to
withdraw the ventilator because of the fear of legal
liability, not precepts of medical ethics, it devised a
mechanism to grant the physicians prospective legal immunity for taking this action. Specifically, the
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that after a prognosis, confirmed by a hospital ethics committee,
that there is “no reasonable possibility of a patient
returning to a cognitive, sapient state,” life-sustain-
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ing treatment can be removed and no one involved,
including the physicians, can be held civilly or criminally responsible for the death.2
The publicity surrounding the Quinlan case motivated two independent developments: it encouraged states to enact “living will” legislation that
provided legal immunity to physicians who honored
patients’ written “advance directives” specifying
how they would want to be treated if they ever became incompetent; and it encouraged hospitals
to establish ethics committees that could attempt to
resolve similar treatment disputes without going
to court.

t he case of nancy cruzan
Although Quinlan was widely followed, the New Jersey Supreme Court could make law only for New
Jersey. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided the
case of Nancy Cruzan in 1990, it made constitutional law for the entire country. Nancy Cruzan was a
young woman in a persistent vegetative state caused
by an accident; she was in physical circumstances
essentially identical to those of Karen Quinlan, except that she was not dependent on a ventilator but
rather, like Terri Schiavo, required only tube feeding
to continue to live.3 The Missouri Supreme Court
had ruled that the tube feeding could be discontinued on the basis of Nancy’s right of self-determination, but that only Nancy herself should be able to
make this decision. Since she could not do so, tube
feeding could be stopped only if those speaking for
her, including her parents, could produce “clear and
convincing” evidence that she would refuse tube
feeding if she could speak for herself.4
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, agreed, saying that the state of Missouri had
the authority to adopt this high standard of evidence (although no state was required to do so) because of the finality of a decision to terminate treatment.3 In the words of the chief justice, Missouri
was entitled to “err on the side of life.” Six of the
nine justices explicitly found that no legal distinction could be made between artificially delivered
fluids and nutrition and other medical interventions, such as ventilator support; none of the other
three justices found a constitutionally relevant distinction. This issue is not controversial as a matter
of constitutional law: Americans have (and have
always had) the legal right to refuse any medical intervention, including artificially delivered fluids and
nutrition.
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in
n engl j med 352;16

a concurring opinion (her vote decided the case),
recognized that young people (such as Karen Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and now Terri Schiavo — all of
whom were in their 20s at the time of their catastrophic injuries) do not generally put explicit treatment instructions in writing. She suggested that had
Cruzan simply said something like “if I’m not able
to make medical treatment decisions myself, I want
my mother to make them,” such a statement should
be a constitutionally protected delegation of the authority to decide about her treatment.3 O’Connor’s
opinion was the reason that the Cruzan case energized a movement — encouraging people to use the
appropriate documents, such as health care proxy
forms or assignments of durable power of attorney,
to designate someone (usually called a health care
proxy, or simply an agent) to make decisions for
them if they are unable to make them themselves.
All states authorize this delegation, and most states
explicitly grant decision-making authority to a close
relative — almost always to the spouse first — if the
patient has not made a designation. Such laws are all
to the good.

the sc hia vo ca se in the courts
Terri Schiavo had a cardiac arrest, perhaps because
of a potassium imbalance, in 1990 (the year Cruzan
was decided), when she was 27 years old. Until her
death in 2005, she had lived in a persistent vegetative state in nursing homes, with constant care,
being nourished and hydrated through tubes. In
1998, Michael Schiavo petitioned the court to decide whether to discontinue the tube feeding. Unlike Quinlan and Cruzan, however, the Schiavo case
involved a family dispute: Ms. Schiavo’s parents objected. A judge found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Terri Schiavo was in a permanent or persistent vegetative state and that, if she
could make her own decision, she would choose to
discontinue life-prolonging procedures. An appeals
court affirmed the first judge’s decision, and the
Florida Supreme Court declined to review it.
Schiavo’s parents returned to court, claiming
that they had newly discovered evidence. After an
additional appeal, the parents were permitted to
challenge the original court findings on the basis
of new evidence related to a new treatment that
they believed might restore cognitive function. Five
physicians were asked to examine Ms. Schiavo —
two chosen by the husband, two by the parents, and
one by the court. On the basis of their examinations and conclusions, the trial judge was persuad-
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ed by the three experts who agreed that Schiavo
was in a persistent vegetative state. The appeals
court affirmed the original decision of the trial
court judge

But in the end this case is not about the aspirations that loving parents have for their
children. It is about Theresa Schiavo’s right
to make her own decision, independent of
her parents and independent of her husband. . . . It may be unfortunate that when
families cannot agree, the best forum we
can offer for this private, personal decision
is a public courtroom and the best decision-maker we can provide is a judge with
no prior knowledge of the ward, but the law
currently provides no better solution that
adequately protects the interests of promoting the value of life.5
The Supreme Court of Florida again refused to
hear an appeal.
Subsequently, the parents, with the vocal and
organized support of conservative religious organizations, went to the state legislature seeking legislation requiring the reinsertion of Ms. Schiavo’s
feeding tube, which had been removed on the basis
of the court decisions.6,7 The legislature passed a
new law (2003-418), often referred to as “Terri’s
Law,” which gave Governor Jeb Bush the authority
to order the feeding tube reinserted, and he did so.
The law applied only to a patient who met the following criteria on October 15, 2003 — in other
words, only to Terri Schiavo:

(b) The court has found that patient to be in a
persistent vegetative state;
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and
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(d) A member of that patient’s family has
challenged the withholding of nutrition and
hydration.
The constitutionality of this law was immediately challenged. In the fall of 2004, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that the law was unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers
— the division of the government into three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), each with its
own powers and responsibilities.8 The doctrine
states simply that no branch may encroach on the
powers of another, and no branch may delegate to
another branch its constitutionally assigned power. Specifically, the court held that for the legislature to pass a law that permits the executive to “interfere with the final judicial determination in a
case” is “without question an invasion of the authority of the judicial branch.”8 In addition, the
court found the law unconstitutional for an independent reason, because it “delegates legislative
power to the governor” by giving the governor “unbridled discretion” to make a decision about a citizen’s constitutional rights. In the court’s words:

Despite the irrefutable evidence that [Schiavo’s] cerebral cortex has sustained irreparable injuries, we understand why a parent who
had raised and nurtured a child from conception would hold out hope that some level of
cognitive function remained. If Mrs. Schiavo
were our own daughter, we could not hold
to such faith.

(a) That patient has no written advance directive;

of

If the Legislature with the assent of the Governor can do what was attempted here, the
judicial branch would be subordinated to the
final directive of the other branches. Also subordinated would be the rights of individuals,
including the well established privacy right to
self determination. . . . Vested rights could
be stripped away based on popular clamor.8
In January 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to hear an appeal brought by Governor Bush. Thereafter, the trial court judge ordered that the feeding tube be removed in 30 days (at 1 p.m., Friday,
March 18) unless a higher court again intervened.
The presiding judge, George W. Greer of the Pinellas County Circuit Court, was thereafter picketed
and threatened with death; he has had to be accompanied by armed guards at all times.
Ms. Schiavo’s parents, again with the aid of a
variety of religious fundamentalist and “right to life”
organizations, sought review in the appeals courts,
a new statute in the state legislature, and finally,
congressional intervention. Both the trial judge and
the appeals courts refused to reopen the case on
the basis of claims of new evidence (including the
2004 statement from Pope John Paul II regarding
fluids and nutrition9) or the failure to appoint an
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independent lawyer for her at the original hearing.
In Florida, the state legislature considered, and the
House passed, new legislation aimed at restoring
the feeding tube, but the Florida Senate — recognizing, I think, that this new legislation would be
unconstitutional for the same reason as the previous legislation was — ultimately refused to approve
the bill. Thereupon, an event unique in American
politics occurred: after more than a week of discussion, and after formally declaring their Easter
recess without action, Congress reconvened two
days after the feeding tube was removed to consider emergency legislation designed to apply only
to Terri Schiavo.

congress at the bedside
Under rules that permitted a few senators to act if
no senator objected, the U.S. Senate adopted a bill
entitled “For the relief of the parents of Theresa
Marie Schiavo” on March 20, 2005. The House, a
majority of whose members had to be present to
vote, debated the same measure from 9 p.m. to midnight on the same day and passed it by a four-toone margin shortly after midnight on March 21.
The President then signed it into law. In substance,
the new law (S. 686) provides that “the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida shall have
jurisdiction” to hear a suit “for the alleged violation
of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the
Constitution or laws of the United States relating to
the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or
medical treatment necessary to sustain her life.”
The parents “have standing” to bring the lawsuit
(the federal court had previously refused to hear the
case on the basis that the parents had no standing
to bring it), and the court is instructed to “determine de novo any claim of a violation of any right
of Theresa Marie Schiavo . . . notwithstanding
any prior State court determination . . .” — that
is, to pretend that no court has made any prior ruling in the case. The act is to provide no “precedent
with respect to future legislation.”
The brief debate on this bill in the House of
Representatives (there were no hearings in either
chamber and no debate at all in the U.S. Senate)
was notable primarily for its uninformed and frenzied rhetoric. It was covered live on television by
C-SPAN. The primary sponsor of the measure, Congressman Thomas DeLay (R-Tex.), for example, asserted that “She’s not a vegetable, just handicapped
like many millions of people walking around today. This has nothing to do with politics, and it’s
n engl j med 352;16

disgusting for people to say that it does.” Others
echoed the sentiments of Senate majority leader
and physician Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), who said that
immediate action was imperative because “Terri
Schiavo is being denied lifesaving fluids and nutrition as we speak.”
Other physician-members of the House chimed
in. Congressman Dave Weldon (R-Fla.) remarked
that, on the basis of his 16 years of medical practice, he was able to conclude that Terri Schiavo is
“not in a persistent vegetative state.” Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-Ga.) agreed, saying “she’s very
much alive.” Another physician, Congressman Joe
Schwarz (R-Mich.), who was a head and neck surgeon for 27 years, opined that “she does have some
cognitive ability” and asked, “How many other patients are there with feeding tubes? Should they be
removed too?” Another physician-congressman,
Tom Price (R-Ga.), thought the law was reasonable
because there was “no living will in place” and the
family and experts disagreed. The only physician
who was troubled by Congress’s public diagnosis
and treatment of Terri Schiavo was James McDermott (D-Wash.), who chided his physician-colleagues for the poor medical practice of making a
diagnosis without examining the patient.
Although he deferred to the medical expertise
of his congressional colleagues with M.D. degrees,
Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.) pointed out
that the chamber was not filled with physicians.
Frank said of the March 20 proceedings: “We’re not
doctors, we just play them on C-SPAN.” The mantras of the debate were that in a life-or-death decision, we should err on the “side of life,” that action
should be taken to “prevent death by starvation”
and ensure the “right to life,” and that Congress
should “protect the rights of disabled people.”
The following day, U.S. District Court Judge
James D. Whittemore issued a careful opinion denying the request of the parents for a temporary restraining order that would require the reinsertion
of the feeding tube.10 The judge concluded that the
parents had failed to demonstrate “a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits” of the case —
a prerequisite for a temporary restraining order.
Specifically, Judge Whittemore found that, as to the
various due-process claims made, the case had been
“exhaustively litigated”; that, throughout, all parties had been “represented by able counsel”; and
that it was not clear how having an additional lawyer
“appointed by the court [for Ms. Schiavo] would
have reduced the risk of erroneous rulings.” As to
the allegation that the patient’s First Amendment
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rights to practice her religion had been violated by
the state, the court held that there were no state
actions involved at all, “because neither Defendant
Schiavo nor Defendant Hospice are state actors.”
Whittemore’s decision was reasonable and consistent with settled law, and was, not suprisingly,
upheld on appeal. The case of Terri Schiavo resulted
in no changes in the law, nor were any good arguments made that legal changes were necessary. The
religious right and congressional Republicans may
nonetheless attempt to use this decision to their
advantage. Despite the fact that Congress itself
sent the case to federal court for determination,
some Republicans have already begun to cite the
ruling as yet another example of “legislating” by the
courts. For they liken the action permitted — the
withdrawal of a feeding tube — to unfavored activities, such as abortion and same-sex marriage,
that courts have allowed to occur. All three activities, they argue, represent attacks on the “culture
of life” and necessitate that the President appoint
federal court judges who value life over liberty.

proxy decision makers, persistent
vegetative states, and death
A vast majority of Americans would not want to be
maintained in a persistent vegetative state by means
of a feeding tube, like Terri Schiavo and Nancy Cruzan.11 The intense publicity generated by this case
will cause many to discuss this issue with their families and, I hope, to sign an advance directive. Such
a directive, in the form of a living will or the designation of a health care proxy, would prevent court
involvement in virtually all cases — although it
might not have solved the problem in the Schiavo
case, because the family members disagreed about
Terri Schiavo’s medical condition and the acceptability of removing the tube in any circumstances.
Despite the impression that may have been created by these three cases, and especially by the grandstanding in Congress, conflicts involving medical
decision making for incompetent patients near the
end of life are no longer primarily legal in nature, if
they ever were. The law has been remarkably stable
since Quinlan (which itself restated existing law):
competent adults have the right to refuse any medical treatment, including life-sustaining treatment
(which includes artificially delivered fluids and nutrition). Incompetent adults retain an interest in
self-determination. Competent adults can execute
an advance directive stating their wishes and designate a person to act on their behalf, and physicians
1714
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can honor these wishes. Physicians and health care
agents should make treatment decisions consistent
with what they believe the patient would want (the
subjective standard). If the patient’s desires cannot
be ascertained, then treatment decisions should be
based on the patient’s best interests (what a reasonable person would most likely want in the same circumstances). This has, I believe, always been the
law in the United States.12
Of course, legal forms or formalities cannot
solve nonlegal problems. Decision making near the
end of life is difficult and can exacerbate unresolved
family feuds that then are played out at the patient’s
bedside and even in the media. Nonetheless, it is
reasonable and responsible for all persons to designate health care agents to make treatment decisions for them when they are unable to make their
own. After this recent congressional intervention,
it also makes sense to specifically state one’s wishes with respect to artificial fluids and hydration —
and that one wants no politicians, even physicianpoliticians, involved in the process.
Most Americans will agree with a resolution that
was overwhelmingly adopted by the California Medical Association on the same day that Congress
passed the Schiavo law: “Resolved: That the California Medical Association expresses its outrage
at Congress’ interference with these medical decisions.”
If there is disagreement between the physician
and the family, or among family members, the involvement of outside experts, including consultants, ethics committees, risk managers, lawyers,
and even courts, may become inevitable — at least
if the patient survives long enough to permit such
involvement. It is the long-lasting nature of the
persistent vegetative state that results in its persistence in the courtrooms of the United States. There
is (and should be) no special law regarding the refusal of treatment that is tailored to specific diseases or prognoses, and the persistent vegetative
state is no exception.13,14 Nor do feeding tubes
have rights: people do. “Erring on the side of life”
in this context often results in violating a person’s
body and human dignity in a way few would want
for themselves. In such situations, erring on the side
of liberty — specifically, the patient’s right to decide on treatment — is more consistent with American values and our constitutional traditions. As
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said in a
1977 case that raised the same legal question: “The
constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is
an expression of the sanctity of individual free
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choice and self-determination as fundamental
constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived
is lessened not by a decision to refuse treatment,
but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice.”15
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
This article has been modified from the version that was published at www.nejm.org on March 22, 2005.
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